A ustrali an Journal of Telec ommunic ati ons and the Di gital Ec onomy , ISSN 2203-1 693, V olume 6 Number Abstract: The routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (RPL) has gained prominence as the standard IoT routing protocol. However, it faces like many other routing protocols diverse attacks. Many studies have been proposed to secure the RPL protocol, and simulation studies have been put forward as the main research method, while testbed experiments, though an authentic research and testing method, have been ignored. Although testbed experiments and simulation studies have their strengths and limitations, testbed techniques could be used as a verifiable validation method for simulation studies. This study is a follow up research work to validate our simulation study, which addressed Blackhole attacks in the RPL routing protocol. In addition, Selective Forwarding attacks are also addressed. It implements a testbed while embedding our Trust-based RPL protocol and the standard RPL protocol in a smart environment configuration. Based on the test experiments, we provide a proofof-concept of the validity of our claim that our Trust-based RPL protocol provides a comprehensive defence (simulation and testbed) against Blackhole and Selective Forwarding attacks.
Routing Metrics and Objective Function in RPL
According to the IETF specification (Winter, 2012) , different OFs could be specified for RPL.
Traffic in a RPL network is transported and delivered based on the defined OF, which could be different for various traffic types. OFs are defined to optimize some particular metrics while also fulfilling specific constraint(s). Accordingly, the OF is used for effective routing path definition based on specific requirements. These requirements could be embedded in a series of programming logic in IoT motes and utilized by RPL for routing purposes. A fundamental reason for the adoption of RPL for LLNs is the separation of the OF from the central protocol specification (Winter, 2012) , thus making it easy for different OF specifications to be built into RPL and which, in turn, makes it useful for a wide range of application scenarios.
Routing metrics are scalar values for determining the 'cost' of a route path. The values are used for making optimal routing decisions, especially when multiple routes are identified. A formal specification of how routes are defined, selected and optimized is regarded as the objective function (OF) of the RPL routing protocol. The network of resource-constrained sensor devices uses metrics defined in the OF to make optimal routing decisions. The use of a scalar value for route determination makes it particularly attractive for embedding trust as a metric for route computation, and the isolation of malicious nodes. Routing metrics are important to the successful creation and preservation of any network topology. Traditional networks employ the use of static metrics (hop count, bandwidth) for routing decisions. The IETF RFC 6550 specification of RPL (Winter, 2012) does not define specific forwarding metric policies.
Furthermore, in the RPL draft from the IETF, constraints are also specified, which are used as filters for the specification of what should be included or excluded in the routing metric dynamics of RPL. Various literatures have discussed the RPL routing protocol and have proposed different metrics for LLNs, which have been presented in Djedjig et al. (2015) ,
Security Vulnerabilities in RPL
Studies have been undertaken that bring to the fore the vulnerabilities in the RPL routing protocol. The authors in Pongle & Chavan (2015b) conducted a study on possible attacks that could be perpetrated against RPL. Similar studies have been conducted and are reported in Airehrour, Gutierrez & Ray (2016a) and Nawir, Amir, Yaakob & Lynn (2016) , while the impact of attacks on the RPL protocol has been reported in Kumar, Matam & Shukla (2016) . In RPL protocol, a Blackhole attacking node advertises itself by broadcasting a false and low DIO rank value to the sink node. This causes nodes within its reach to select it as their parent for a downward route transmission from the sink node. The Blackhole node immediately commences the discard of packets upon receipt from its neighbour nodes. In addition, a Selective Forwarding attacking node selectively or randomly forwards packets it has received. The aim of this type of attack is two-fold. The first is the desire to degrade network performance by increasing the packet loss rate. The second is to act as a 'man in the middle' in order to inhibit other nodes that are seeking to communicate through it (the attacker) with the sink node. This scenario creates a denial of service (DoS). 
Validating Simulation via Testbed
Simulation has over the years proved to be a fundamental testing and diagnostic tool. This is especially true for network simulations, and this has become a global standard for wireless sensor network testing and evaluation. However, as sophisticated as a simulation may be, it is often inadequate as an investigation platform for real-world deployments (Fortier, 2002; Tan, 2010) . Sensors, and indeed IoT sensors, have continued to improve in technological advancements; their form factors have become, and are continuing to be, smaller by the day while their processing capabilities have soared in recent times. In addition, some of the measuring devices on these sensors have not been adequately and accurately simulated (Fortier, 2002) .
A testbed, on the other hand, is a collection of deployed hardware infrastructure, developed for physical network experimentation and integrated with software services, for controlling and managing hardware and experiments executed on it. Therefore, a physical testbed becomes imperative, as it is designed to support physical experimentation, w hich addresses the gaps that simulations are not able to fill. A fundamental feature of a testbed is its focus on a specific aspect of the total system. This helps in furthering a deeper understanding of the functional and operational requirements of the system while capturing specific behaviours under unique conditions, which otherwise would not have been captured during a simulation.
Results gathered during testbed runs can be quantitatively measured and analysed, on which design decisions can be predicated from the theoretical and empirical findings.
Trust and Reputation Based on RPL Objective Function
RPL uses routing metrics defined in its Objective Function to create the DODAG. Essentially, the routing metrics help in the creation of the network routes and hence result in optimal routes. The Contiki platform (Thingsquare, 2016) uses Minimum Rank with Hysteresis
Objective Function (MRHOF) by default, which minimizes the expected transmission count (ETX) values.
This study compares the MRHOF implementation of RPL and our Trust-based implementation of RPL. Our previous work (Airehrour, 2016b ) was compared with a MRHOF implementation of RPL and, based on that, testbed experiments were similarly conducted.
In our previous work (Airehrour, 2016b) , a Trust-based system was proposed for RPL protocol, which provides security against Blackhole attacks. The Trust-based protocol provides a feedback-aware trust system for a RPL network. In this system, a node evaluates the trust value of its neighbour-node with respect to the good forwarding behaviour of the node. This study was further improved for the detection and isolation of Selective Forwarding attacks, and this was reported in Airehrour et al. (2017) . We recap some fundamental trust computations in our previous study below. The trusted node(s) are selected for routing decisions while maintaining the rank order of all nodes in the RPL network. Trust is computed based on Equation 1. while Figure 2 presents the algorithm for trusted parent selection and isolation of blackhole nodes.
Computing and Embedding Trust in RPL

=
In Equation 1, Ndlv is the number of node i's packets delivered through node j, and Nsent is the total number of packets sent by node i to node j.
Blackhole and Selective Forwarding Detection and Isolation
This section describes the detection and isolation of Blackhole and Selective-Forwarding nodes. After the computation of the trust values of nodes, the nodes are ranked in the magnitude of their trust values while maintaining the rank order of nodes, as specified in RFC 6550 (Winter, 2012) . The nodes with high trust values are used for secure routing decisions.
To achieve the objective above, we assumed that the network operates in promiscuous mode and hence we modified the RPL protocol to achieve the functions stated below:
• Every child node keeps a record of the number of packets forwarded to its parent.
• A child-node assesses the number of packets forwarded by a parent-node on its behalf. This is much like the DAO and DAO-ACK in RPL.
• A node queues up its packets in its buffer for delivery. In coding the Blackhole behaviour, an attacking Blackhole node always keeps its buffer empty, since it discards packets sent to it and does not report packets forwarded to its child node, whereas a normal node reports its details to its child node.
Testbed Experiments
The testbed experiment undertaken in this study serves as a proxy for a smart home environment, which is vulnerable to attacks. In the testbed setup, fourteen AS-XM1000 motes (refer to Figure 3 Table 2 lists the deployment settings and configurations. To complete the testbed setup, the respective UDP_sink, UDP_sender and malicious codes were embedded into the XM1000 motes using ContikiRPL (MRHOF) and Trust-based RPL. Figure 4 shows a physical partial view of the motes deployment in the research laboratory. The motes are circled in red. In the accompanying sections, the testbed performance results between MRHOF-RPL and the proposed Trust-based RPL under Blackhole attacks are discussed. In the figures 5 and 6 the motes are depicted as y.y. Hence, mote 1 is shown as 1.1; mote 2 as 2.2. In addition, the childparent relationship is indicated with a blue arrow along with the expected transmission count (ETX) value between them. respectively. Consequently, three disjointed network segments were formed, which resulted in unsuspecting motes 2, 3 and 12 selecting mote 13 as their parent, and motes 6 and 7 selecting mote 14 as their parent. The remaining motes were connected to the sink mote. Furthermore, as evident in Figure 7 , the Trust-based RPL could detect and isolate Blackhole attacks during routing operations. The first five minutes of RPL operation witnessed the detection of a slightly higher level of initial Blackhole attacks among the malicious motes. Our Trust-based RPL could identify and isolate the Blackhole attack motes and thus the malicious motes were not considered for routing decisions in the network. The testbed result discussed above agrees with the simulation study presented in our paper (Airehrour, 2016b) . In both cases, the testbed and simulation studies had similar detection pattern and detection rate of Blackhole attacks during RPL operation. 
Network Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the testbed analysis of the network throughput and the packet loss rates of MRHOF-RPL and our Trust-based RPL protocols while under Blackhole attacks. The network throughput (kilobits per second), which is the amount of data transmitted in each period over a given communications channel, is presented. A higher throughput shows a more stable network topology despite the presence of Blackhole attackers. As shown from the throughput comparison presented in Figure 9 , the Trust-based RPL protocol maintained a significantly higher throughput measurement over and above MRHOF-RPL. Motes 7 and 8 achieved the highest and lowest throughputs of 3 kbps and 0.34 kbps under MRHOF RPL.
Under the Trust-based RPL, motes 5 and 4 achieved the highest and lowest throughputs of 6.6 kbps and 2 kbps, respectively. This clearly implies that our Trust-based RPL protocol delivers better network performance than the MRHOF-RPL under Blackhole attacks. The testbed network throughput measurements reported here are similar to the simulation results reported by our simulation study in Airehrour et al. (2016b) . Figure 10 compares the packet-loss percentage between the Trust-based RPL and MRHOF-RPL. Packet percentage loss is the ratio of the total packets lost to the total packets sent between a sender and a sink mote. A lower loss rate is indicative of better packet delivery and hence a more stable link between network nodes. From Figure 10 , the Trust-based RPL protocol maintained a packet loss rate of less than 28%, but MRHOF-RPL had 60 to 75% packet loss rates. The testbed packet-loss-rate results presented in Figure 10 agree with the simulation study results reported in Airehrour et al. (2016b) .
Figure 10. Percentage of packet loss comparison between Trust-based RPL and MRHOF-RPL under Blackhole attacks during the testbed experiment
Isolation of Selective Attacks
The testbed experiment was extended to test the performance of the Trust-based RPL protocol and MRHOF-RPL under Selective Forwarding attacks using the deployed XM1000 motes.
When the test was conducted, an instance of the network topology was captured in the sensor data collection menu of Contiki/Cooja, and the topology instance is displayed in Figure 11 . It reveals that the Trust-based RPL protocol could detect and isolate malicious motes 13 and 14 from its route topology formation. However, in Figure 12 , which is the network topology formation of MRHOF-RPL, it could not mitigate the effect of malicious activities of the Selective Forwarding attacking motes (13 and 14) in the network. Motes 3, 6 and 8 were drawn to malicious mote 13 while motes 2, 7 and 12 were drawn to malicious mote 14. The rest of the motes, however, were connected to the sink mote. Figure 12 illustrates the situation whereby packets sent to mote 1 by motes 2, 7 and 12 cannot be delivered during the period they were connected to mote 13. Also, packets sent by motes 2, 7 and 12 cannot be received by mote 1 during the time they were connected to malicious mote 14, since the network is segmented and cannot connect to the central sink mote. 
Detection and Isolation of Attack Nodes
The testbed experiment in Figure 13 shows the detection of attacks perpetrated by malicious motes 13 and 14 performing Selective Forwarding attacks. The first five minutes shows the detection of a high amount of attacks, while the remaining simulation period (10 -60 minutes)
shows a relatively stable number of attacks detected (50 -75). The initial high flow of attacks and detection in the first five minutes is attributed to RPL's proactive routing nature, which floods the network with DIOs. Due to this, the Selective Forwarding attacking motes (13 and 14) rapidly, but selectively, intercept and forward packets as per their malicious behaviour.
Conversely, MRHOF-RPL protocol has no mechanism for detecting Selective Forwarding attacks perpetrated by malicious motes 13 and 14 during the experimentation period. 
Network Performance Measures
In the throughput comparison between MRHOF-RPL and the Trust-based RPL shown in Figure 15 , the Trust-based RPL protocol displayed a better throughput performance over MRHOF-RPL. MRHOF-RPL consistently lagged behind the Trust-based RPL in throughput performance during the testbed trials. Trust-based RPL maintained 4 -6.5 kbps throughput range, while MRHOF-RPL had a range of 1 -4 kbps. Figure 16 shows the packet loss rates between MRHOF-RPL and Trust-based RPL. The Trustbased RPL maintained packet loss rates between 15% -27.7%; MRHOF-RPL on the other hand, had packet loss rates of 60% -72.7%. It can be summarised, therefore, from Figure 16 , that the Selective Forwarding attacks of malicious motes 13 and 14 had a more significant impact against the MRHOF-RPL network than is the case for the network using the Trustbased RPL protocol. This further shows Trust-based RPL as having better network performance over MRHOF-RPL under the Selective Forwarding attacks. 
